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PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. ARDEN'S REFUSAL To EXTRADITE TERRAQ FULLY COMPLIES WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. Terraq Will Not Receive a Fair Trial in Remorra.
Under customary international law, criminal defendants have a
fundamental right to a fair trial.' A state may refuse to extradite a fugitive if
there is "substantial ground for believing that the individual will not receive a
fair trial. "'2 In Barcelona Traction, Power and Light Co., this Court
characterized the protection of fundamental human rights as obligations erga
omnes--owed by all states to all persons.3 In Soering v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights suggested that the requested state may be
liable in an extraordinary circumstance where extradition would expose the
fugitive to a risk of "a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting
country."
4
This case presents the Court with such an extraordinary circumstance.
Remorra's actions demonstrate its resolve to exact revenge. The Remorran
Intelligence Service violated Nylesia's territorial integrity by orchestrating a
predawn raid on Terraq's home.5 International condemnation of state-
sponsored abduction in the aftermath of the Eichmann6 and Alvarez-Machain
7
cases demonstrates that international law does not permit invasion of a state's
territorial sovereignty to kidnap a fugitive.8 In its zeal for revenge, Remorra
1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 10, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), 71, U.N. Doc. A/810; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 476, cmt. h
(1987) [hereinafter Restatement]; see Soering v. United Kingdom, 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1101 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1989); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2 International Criminal Law 415 (1986).
3. Barcelona Traction, Power and Light Co. (Second Phase) (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32-33.
4. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1101.
5. Comp. 23.
6. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmam, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. Sup.
Ct. 1962).
7. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
8. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 868 (1960); Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item
10, at- 139-140, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/27 (1993); Inter-American Juridical Committee Legal
Opinion in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 32 I.L.M. 277 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1993).
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executed three members of the NPA's Revolt Planning Committee without even
indicting them.9 Although Remorran criminal procedure provides a right to an
appeal that usually takes about nine months, all three were executed
immediately after the court's verdict.' °  The next day, a Remorran
spokesperson declared, "Your government promises that Terraq will be tried
and punished for his crimes. The blood of our martyrs will be dishonored
unless such criminals receive the justice they deserve!""' The politically
explosive context of this case provides "substantial ground" for Arden to
believe that Terraq will not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, Arden properly
denied Remorra's extradition demand.
In complying with customary international law, Arden is not vindicating
Terraq's right to a fair trial purely for the sake of the right itself. Rather, the
prospect of any lasting peace is inextricably linked to the neutral, evenhanded
disposition of justice.
B. Arden Must Deliver Terraq to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Integra Pursuant to Its U.N. Charter Obligations.
As a member of the United Nations, Arden must implement U.N. Security
Council enforcement measures and cooperate with subsidiary organizations
created to enforce those measures.12 These obligations supersede any other
international law duty. 13 The Statutes of both the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Tribunals illustrate the obligation of all U.N. members to cooperate
with criminal tribunals established by the Security Council. 4 The Secretary-
General of the United Nations reinforced this obligation by mandating that any
request by the Yugoslavia Tribunal to surrender an individual shall be
considered to be a binding enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the
Charter.' 5 This Court has held that all U.N. members must carry out Security
9. Comp. 25; Clar. 16; see also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(3)(a).
10. Clar. 2; Comp. 25.
11. Comp. 31.
12. Comp. ISSUES/CLAIMS; see Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 25,
29, 39, 48, 49, 24 U.S.T. 2225 [hereinafter Charter].
13. See Charter, supra note 12, art. 103.
14. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 29, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doec. S/25704
(1993) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
28, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter Rwanda Tribunal Statute].
15. See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1188 (1993); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 I.L.M. 32, 43 (Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber
1996) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber].
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Council decisions, which "prevail over . . . any other international
agreement[.]" 16
Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council established
ICTFI17 which, in turn, formally requested that Arden surrender Terraq to its
custody.'" Arden's Charter obligations mandate compliance. If Remorra
opposes the Security Council's executive decision, Remorra's quarrel is with
the Security Council, not with Arden.
1. ICTFI Represents a Legitimate Exercise of the Security Council's
Chapter VII Powers.
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression," and shall take appropriate
measures to maintain international peace and security. 19 The Security Council
acted properly under Article 39 of the Charter because the Integran conflict
threatened international peace2 ° The Integran war claimed the lives of over
120,000 people and the killing temporarily ceased only after a regional force
from an association of neighboring states disarmed most, but not all, of the
combatants. 2' Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the regional association of
neighboring states reacted to a flood of refugees2 into their own states, or out
of fear that the Integran conflict would spill over into their territories.
Remorra's attempt to label this war as an "internal armed conflict" does
not bar the Security Council's authority to determine a "threat to peace."23 The
Security Council, with the support of the General Assembly, found that the
civil wars in the Congo, Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda constituted threats to
international peace and security.' The Appeals Chamber for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber")
recognized that the practice of the U.N. membership at large reflects a common
understanding that a "threat to peace" may include internal armed conflicts.'
Article 41 lists non-forcible implementation measures of the Security
Council, but the list is not exhaustive. 2  The Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber held
16. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126.
17. Comp. 22.
18. Comp. 33.
19. Charter, supra note 12, arts. 39, 41, 42.
20. See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 42-45.
21. Comp. 15, 16.
22. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S.
137; 1 Oppenheim's International Law § 399 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter Oppenheim].
23. See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 43.
24. Id.; S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
25. See Yugoslavia Appeals Oamber, 35 I.L.M. at 43.
26. See id. at 44-45; Charter, supra note 12, art. 41.
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that "the establishment of an International Tribunal falls squarely within the
powers of the Security Council under Article 41."27 This Court has never
struck down a Security Council resolution as a violation of the Charter."
In this case, the maintenance of a lasting peace depends on the neutral
disposition of justice. The Security Council acted within its discretion to
maintain peace by establishing ICTFI.29 Even the cessation of hostilities does
not bar the invocation of Chapter VII 3
2. ICTFI Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Terraq's Crimes.
The former Integra was and Arden is a party to the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols.3 At the time of Terraq's alleged crimes, Integra still existed32
and these treaties were in force. Even if the Court characterizes the Integran
war as "internal," Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions govern this conflict.33 As demonstrated in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol
H, which proscribe, inter alia, torture, taking hostages, and pillage, are subject
to individual criminal culpability.' The international community has realized
that individual responsibility for such offenses should not hinge on whether the
atrocities occurred technically within a country's boundaries. 3
Customary humanitarian norms prohibiting crimes against peace and
humanity apply equally to internal conflicts.36 Those slaughtered in civil wars
deserve no less protection than those killed in international conflicts. 37 In
27. Id. at 45.
28. Geoffrey Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Tadic, 36 Va. J. Int'l L. 687, 703 n.120 (1996).
29. See Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 44.
30. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
31. Clar. 19.
32. Comp. 16.
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Civilian Convention]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-114.
34. Rwanda Tribunal Statute, supra note 14, art. 4; see Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 554, 558 (1995).
35. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994);
Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 35 I.L.M. at 64.
36. See id. at 69-70, 72; Report of the Secretary-General, 35 I.L.M. at 1173.
37. See Richard Goldstone, Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View,
7 Transnat'l L. & Contemporary Probs. 1, 4 (1997); G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,




establishing ICTFI, the Security Council ensured that the atrocities in the
former Integra would receive the full attention of the international community.
3. Delivering Terraq to ICTFI is Consistent With Its
Complementary Jurisdiction.
ICTFI's jurisdiction is "complementary" to that of Remorra.38 The
International Law Commission's Draft Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal ("ILC Draft") uses the same "complementary" jurisdiction
language.39 The ILC Draft preamble provides "the [International Criminal
Tribunal] is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems
in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be
ineffective."4° Although the Draft Statute is silent on what "unavailable" or
"ineffective" means, one commentator defines "ineffectiveness" as either
"(1) the forum provides a standard of guilt or punishment which is
incompatible with international norms; or (2) the State in question has not
demonstrated an actual intention to prosecute or to conduct a full and prompt
investigation." 4' Extraditing Terraq to Remorra would violate Arden's
obligation to safeguard his fundamental right to a fair trial.42 Remorra's lust
for revenge renders its judicial process ineffective and undercuts its primacy
claim.
II. DELIVERING TERRAQ To IcTFI DoEs NOT BREACH ANY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS.
Extradition depends on the existence of a treaty obligation.43 Absent a
treaty, aut dedere, autjudicare, try or extradite, is a moral obligation rooted
in comity." Even assuming that Arden does have a duty under international
law to investigate and try alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity,45
Arden is complying with this obligation by sending Terraq to ICTFI.'
38. Comp. 22.
39. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
U.N. Doc. A 49/10 (1994).
40. Id. atpmbl., 3.
41. Jeffrey Bleich, Complementarity, 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales 231, 238, 241 (1997).
42. See supra part I.A.
43. See Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law 157 (1991).
44. Id.; see Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 17.
45. See Velasquez Rodriguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 291 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
1989); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 Yale L. J. 2537 (1991).
46. See Kenneth Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants Before the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 Crim. L. F. 557, 569 (1994).
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A. The Extradition Treaty Between Arden and the Former Integra Does
Not Survive Integra's Dissolution.
Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to
Treaties ("Succession Treaty"), a successor state assumes the treaty obligations
in force that apply to its territory at the time the successor state separates from
an existing state. 47 The Succession Treaty is not a codification of the law of
state succession and does not reflect state practice.48
Article 7 of the Succession Treaty limits its application "to a succession
of States which has occurred after the entry into force of the Convention except
as may be otherwise agreed. , 49 Remorra signed the Peace Treaty and formally
assumed the governmental responsibility over its territory no later than April
1996.50 Because the Succession Treaty entered into force on November 6,
1996,"' its provisions do not apply in the present case.
Even if this Court finds that the Succession Treaty applies, Arden has not
yet ratified the Succession Treaty,52 and therefore is not bound to recognize
Remorra as a successor to the extradition treaty between Arden and the former
Integra. As a signatory to the Successor Treaty, Arden is cognizant of its duty
not to defeat the object of the Succession Treaty.53 Arden's refusal to
recognize Remorra as a successor to the extradition treaty, however, does not
defeat the Succession Treaty's goal of "ensuring greater juridical security in
international relations." 54 Arden objects to Remorra's succession claim because
of the intimate, predominately political nature of the bilateral extradition treaty.
Without such an agreement, no state could obtain jurisdiction over a fugitive
located in another state without violating that state's territorial sovereignty. 55
The decision to enter into a bilateral extradition agreement is a deliberate
exercise of autonomy based on the consent of the sovereign governments
involved.
47. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, art.
34, U.N. Doc. AICONF.80/31 [hereinafter Succession Treaty].
48. Detlev Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers' View, 33 Va. Int'l L. 275, 294-95 (1993).
49. Succession Treaty, supra note 47, art. 7(1).
50. Comp. 16, 20.
51. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December
1996, at 878, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/15 (1997).
52. Comp. ISSUES/CLAIMS.
53. Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
54. Succession Treaty, supra note 47, pmbl.
55. See R. Governor of Brixton Prison, exparte Soblen, 33 I.L.R. 255, 277-78 (Eng. 1963);
Ivan Shearer, Extradition in International Law 28-29 (1971).
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There is a distinction between "personal" and "dispositive" treaties in the
area of state succession. 56 "Personal treaties," such as those involving judicial
cooperation, military alliances, or economic aid, are fundamentally contractual
in nature and premised upon the continued existence of the contracting
parties." "Dispositive treaties," such as those establishing borderlines, run
with the land and are intended to be permanent.5 8 Because extradition treaties
are analogous to judicial cooperation treaties, they are "personal" and do not
survive the dissolution of a contracting party. State practice supports this
conclusion. When Czechoslovakia emerged as a new state after the dissolution
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was neither bound nor entitled to claim the
benefits of the personal bilateral treaties of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 9
Similarly, when Singapore seceded from the Federation of Malaysia, it did not
succeed to any prior bilateral extradition treaty absent mutual consent of
Singapore and third parties. 60 Absent mutual consent, Remorra does not
succeed to the extradition treaty between Arden and the former Integra.
B. Even Assuming That the Extradition Treaty Applies, the Political
Character of Terraq' Offenses Jeopardizes His Right to a Fair Trial.
Extradition requires a state to balance the need to ensure that no serious
crime goes unpunished with the concern that persons accused obtain a fair
trial. 61 A primary justification for the political offense exception is to safeguard
the accused's right to an impartial trial.62
States have drawn distinctions between "pure" and "relative" political
crimes.' "Pure" political offenses are acts against the State including treason,
sedition, and espionage.' Individuals accused of such crimes traditionally have
56. See 3 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or The Principles of Natural Law § 203
(James Scott ed. & Charles Fenwick trans., 1758 ed.) (1916); Daniel O'Connell, The Law of State
Succession 15 (1956) [hereinafter State Succession].
57. See State Succession, supra note 56, at 15; Daniel O'Connell, State Succession in
Municipal Law and International Law 212 (1967); Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 63.
58. See State Succession, supra note 56, at 49.
59. Shearer, supra note 55, at 46.
60. Succession of States in Respect of Bilateral Treaties, Study Prepared by the Secretariat,
[1970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 122, 118.
61. Restatement, supra note 2, § 476, cmt. a.
62. See Christine Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition 3, 203
(1980); Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Political Offences in International Law 28 (1977).
63. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-96 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1986); In re Campora, 24
I.L.R. 518, 521 (Chile Sup. Ct. 1957); In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Fr. Ct. App. 1947);
In re Ockert, 7 Ann. Dig. 369, 370 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1953).
64. See Manuel Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition
of Political Offenders, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 927, 942 (1964); Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793-94.
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received protection from extradition.(' States, however, apply three distinct
tests to determine "relative" political transgressions.' The Political Incidence
Test centers on two primary elements: whether the act occurred during a
political uprising and whether action was incidental or in furtherance of that
uprising.67 The Proportionality Test focuses on the predominance of the actor's
underlying political motivation, 68 and the Objective Test focuses on the identity
of the victim and the nature of the rights harmed.'
Here, Remorra charged Terraq with treason, sedition, and murder. 70
"Pure" political offenses include treason and sedition and are non-
extraditable. 7' The alleged murders happened during a political uprising.72
Although Terraq's political motivations do not absolve him of accountability,
they affect his right to a fair trial and must be considered.
The U.N. panel of experts accused Terraq of personally killing the Mayor
of Telfin and ordering the torture of two ethnic Remorrans that resulted in their
death.' These constitute political incidents because they occurred during a
political revolt whose objective was to transform the Remorran dominated
power structure into one dominated by Nylesians.74 The Mayor openly
opposed the NPA and his death occurred in furtherance of a bona fide political
power struggle. In the Castioni case,75 a British Court refused to extradite a
fugitive to Switzerland for killing a state council member during the course of
a politically motivated riot because his conduct met the requirements of the
Political Incidence Test.76
The charges regarding Terraq's alleged ordering of torture causing the
death of two Remorrans are similar to the Artukovic case.' Artukovic ordered
the slaughter of more than 200,000 people in concentration camps in the former
Yugoslavia. 78 From 1951 to 1959, U.S. courts refused to grant the former
65. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793-94; Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145; Manuel Garcia-Mora, Treason,
Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenders Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 65,
65 (1964).
66. See Gilbert, supra note 43, at 120-29.
67. See, e.g., Quinn, 783 F.2d at 795-96.
68. See, e.g., Della Savia v. Ministere Public de la Confederation, 72 I.L.R. 618, 625 (Switz.
Fed. Trib. 1969).
69. See, e.g., Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. at 145-46.
70. Comp. 33.




75. In re Castioni, 1. L.R.Q.B. 149 [1891].
76. Id. at 150, 153.
77. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383, 383, 388 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
78. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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Yugoslavia's request for extradition because the complaint failed to demonstrate
that Artukovic committed "murder" and, alternatively, because such conduct
fell within the scope of the Political Incidence Test. 9 Pursuant to a renewed
extradition request charging him with "war crimes," a U.S. court ultimately
extradited Artukovic to the former Yugoslavia in 1986, but the court
acknowledged that Artukovic's right to a fair trial was a factor in deciding
whether to extradite.'0 About 45 years had elapsed between the time Artukovic
was initially charged with murder and his extradition. The passage of time and
the subsequent change in the former Yugoslavia's political climate significantly
decreased the likelihood of an unfair proceeding.
The political character of Terraq's alleged crimes in this case, combined
with the highly charged political climate in Remorra, ensure that Terraq will
be denied a fair trial. His political motivations impact his right to a fair trial.
C. As an Enemy of All Humanity, Terraq Injured the International
Community and Should Be Held Accountable Before ICTFI.
The decision to extradite a fugitive must also consider the substantial
interest of the international legal order to make sure that serious atrocities are
punished.8' The U.N. expert panel branded Terraq as an enemy of all
humanity for violating international humanitarian law.' The Security Council
unanimously adopted the panel's report accusing Terraq of expelling
Remorrans from their homes in Telfm; setting them out to sea without food,
water or fuel; killing the Mayor of Telfm; ordering the torture of Remorran
prisoners that caused their deaths; and seizing weapons and food from
Remorran homes in Telfin. 3 As an enemy of all humanity, Terraq injured not
only Remorra, but the entire international community,' and should answer for
his actions before an international tribunal. Universal crimes that shock the
conscience of the international community do not lie within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any one state.' If Remorra's objective is lasting peace, a neutral
disposition of justice is critical to its goal. Accordingly, the best interest of
79. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 389, 392-393.
80. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1986).
81. Restatement, supra note 2, § 476, cmt. a.
82. Comp. 21.
83. Comp. 20-22.
84. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity and International Criminal Law 512-
13 (1992); Jordan Paust, Universality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law:
No U.S. Sanctuary for Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. Int'l L. 337, 340 (1989).
85. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Aug. 10, 1995, 42-43, available on World Wide Web at http://
www.igc.apc.org/tribunal; see Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 78, 80 (1993); Draft Articles on the Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 22(2)(a) at 50, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238-50,
U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
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both the international community and Remorra demands that Terraq obtains a
fair proceeding before ICTFI, an international trier of fact in a neutral
location. 6 In light of Arden's compliance with international law, questions of
state responsibility and reparation do not arise.
III. ARDEN HAS No DUTY To MAKE REPARATIONS To REMORRA.
The duty to make reparations for international law violations is only
triggered when an act or omission of a state, direct or imputable, breaches an
international duty, the breach causes injury, and, in the case of injury to
individuals, local remedies are exhausted. 7 Here, Arden has violated no
international duty; 8 this Court should decline to award compensatory damages.
A. International Law Does Not Require Reparations for International Law
Violations Resulting in Direct Injury to States Absent Actual Damages.
"[T]here is no compelling authority to support the claim that a mere
breach of international law without injury to nationals or material damage to the
state should be met by an award of damages by a tribunal."89 Although some
publicists suggest that "a government is always entitled to some damages...
irrespective of whether the breach has caused any actual material damage or
pecuniary loss[,]"' they disagree as to a state's right to reparations absent
actual loss.9 "Moral" or "political" damages are difficult to ascertain and
rarely awarded.'
The crystallization of international law requires both repeated conduct and
opiniojuris.3 Persistent objection by one or more states prevents conduct from
86. Clar. 15.
87. See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.)(Jurisdiction), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, 21;
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.)(Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 21-3, and 44-5 (sep. op. J. Alvarez);
International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, July 25, 1980, arts. 1, 3, 8(a),
11(1), 22 U.N. Doc. A135/10 (Shabtai Rosenne, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter State Responsibility
Articles]; A. A. Cancado Trindade, The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies 7-13 (Robert Jennings
ed., 1983).
88. See supra part I.B-C.
89. Christine Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law 91 (1987); see Parry [1956] 2
Hague Recueil des Cours 653, 657, 671-95.
90. G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Case of The I'm Alone, [1936] Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 82, 109; see
also Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (Part 1) 236 (1983) [hereinafter
Brownlie on State Responsibility].
91. Gray, supra note 89, at 85-92.
92. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 44-7 (sep. op. J. Alvarez); Gray, supra note 89, at 84;
Brownlie on State Responsibility, supra note 90, at 236.
93. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 51; Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 6-9 (4th ed. 1990); Barry Carter & Phillip Trimble,
International Law 143 (2d ed. 1995).
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crystallizing.' Because no custom exists in this regard, this Court should
decline awarding such damages.
B. Remorra Cannot Seek Representative Damages Because It Cannot
Prove the Nationality of the Individuals Harmed or the Extent of the Harm
Suffered.
Before it can provide diplomatic protection, a state must prove that the
person concerned is its national.' This Court has dismissed claims when a
state could not prove that the individual was its national.' Nationality is
determined by domestic law with one caveat--the determination must not violate
international law.' Citizenship is traditionally determined by descent from a
national or by birth within state territory.9" With regard to state succession, the
successor states "determine to what extent former nationals of the extinct state
acquire their nationality."' Such determination is binding, so long as a
genuine link exists and the successor states provide for the possibility of
naturalization for those having a substantial connection with the territory.I"
Here, Remorra and Nylesia properly provided for citizenship by place of
birth and naturalization within five years. 1 By the middle of the 20th century,
a large number of ethnic Remorrans had migrated to the inland capital of
Nylar, where they gradually took economic and political control of Integra. 2
Although during the war many Remorrans fled to former, traditionally
Remorran areas, Nylar, their birthplace, was included within the new territory
of Nylesia.' 03 Upon the facts of the Compromis, one may infer that many
ethnic Remorrans are Nylesian citizens. Remorra's inability to prove the
Remorran citizenship of all of the harmed individuals makes it virtually
impossible to prove the extent of the harm suffered.
Restitution remains the accepted basis for damages in international law.°4
When damages are asserted, the Court must determine "the extent of the
94. Carter & Trimble, supra note 93, at 143.
95. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 59 (dis. op. J. Guggenheim); Greece v.
Bulgaria, 7 I.L.R. 91, 95 (1933-34); Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 150, 158; Richard Lillich & Bums
Weston, International Clainu: Contemporary European Practice 1-3 (1982).
96. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 26.
97. Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (U.K. v. Fr.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.4, 24-
25; Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 20-21; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 381-84.
98. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 56; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 387.
99. Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 63.
100. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 23; Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 62, 151.
101. Comp. 17.
102. Comp. 6-8.
103. Comp. 4, 14, 21.
104. Chorzow Factory (Indemnity), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, 47; Marjorie Whiteman,
Damages in International Law 80-82 (1937).
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damage." '5 To make this determination, a claimant must demonstrate an
actual loss reasonably certain and ascertainable. " In Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, this Court's predecessor dismissed the claim for indemnity
because no loss had been proved."° This Court has awarded damages in only
two cases involving claims for non-material harm: the S.S. Wimbledon and
Corfu Channel cases--both of which involved substantial evidence of actual
harm.'08 Evidence of actual damages stemming from Arden's alleged breach
of international law is at best inferential. Because Remorra cannot establish
actual loss caused by Arden, this Court cannot award Remorra compensation.
C. Punitive Damages Are Not Commonly Awarded in International Law.
Punitive damages conflict with the principles of restitution and
sovereignty, °9 and "imposition of such damages goes beyond the jurisdiction
conferred on the ICJ. International tribunals traditionally decline to impose
punitive damages."' Although regional and domestic tribunals award modest
moral or non-pecuniary damages," 2 these awards do not begin to reach the
amount requested by Remorra. An award of US$100 million would be
excessively punitive and should be denied.
D. The Requested Damages Are Inappropriate and Premature.
As the adjudicative arm of the United Nations, this Court must enforce the
spirit of the U.N. Charter and support the Security Council's decision to
establish ICTFI." 3 In establishing ICTFI, the "Council struck a meaningful
105. Gray, supra note 89, at 79.
106. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.)(Merits), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
5, 40; Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 203-05.
107. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, at 39-40.
108. See S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., Fr., Italy, and Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No .1,
18-32; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.)(Compensation), 1949 I.C.J. 244, 247-50; see also Gray, supra
note 89, at 77-78, 83-84.
109. See G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 674 (1957); Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law 235-36 (1987).
110. Eduardo de Arechega, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, [19781 159
Hague Recueil des Cours 1, 287.
111. See Whiteman, supra note 104, at 716-23; Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. at 203-05;
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Adv. Op.), 1949 I.C.J. 174, 186;
Lusitania, 1 R.I.A.A. 17, 25-32 (1924).
112. Schonenberger & Durmaz v. Switzerland, (1989) 11 EHRR 202, III.A; Velasquez
Rodriguez, 28 I.L.M. at 328-29; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 32 I.L.M. 106, 108 n.4 (U.S. 1993); Letelier v. Republic of Cile,
31 I.L.M. 1, 11-15 (Chile-U.S. Claims Comm'n 1992).
113. See supra part III.C.
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blow against impunity."" 4 Awarding damages so Remorra can establish a
Truth Commission will constitute a ruling that ICTFI was improperly
established. Indeed, withdrawal of support will be a license "to commit war
crimes with impunity.""5
Apart from the Truth Commission in El Salvador," 6 Truth Commissions
have been "resolutely domestic""' and have never been funded by a third-party
or awarded by an international tribunal. "Truth commissions have the greatest
chance of success in societies that have already created a powerful political
consensus behind reconciliation.""'B Here, the lack of political consensus
within Remorra indicates that a Truth Commission is premature. The
Remorran people thirst for a criminal prosecution. "' Not until its prayer for
relief does Remorra offer the Truth Commission as an option. As ICTFI is
valid and the Truth Commission lacks consensus, Remorra's request must be
denied.
IV. ABSENT CLEAR EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF AND TITLE
To THE BANK FUNDS AND ACCOUNTING, ARDEN MUST PROTECT THE
FUNDS.
A. The Conflicting Evidence in the Compromis Does Not Establish a Clear
Duty on Arden's Part to Transfer the Funds or Accounting to Remorra.
The Compromis fails to delineate from whom the Nylesian separatists,
associated with the NPA, obtained the US$20 million, later diverted to Arden.
The money may be private property seized during the war,"' ° war booty,12'
114. Richard Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 485, 499 (1996).
115. Goldstone, supra note 114, at 499.
116. Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 497, 498 (1994); see also Paul Marquardt, Law without Borders: The Constitutionality
of an International Criminal Court, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 73, 92 (1995); Jon Van Dyke &
Gerald Berkley, Redressing Human Rights Abuses, 20 Deny. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 243, 256 (1991-92).
117. Azanian Peoples Organization v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 91 Am. J.
Int'l L. 360, 364 (1997).
118. Goldstone, supra note 114, at 496.
119. Comp. 23-25.
120. See Civilian Convention, supra note 33, art. 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art. 18, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol II, supra note
33, art. 4(2)(g); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, arts.
46-8, 52, 53, 55, 56, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; 2 Oppenheim's
International Law: Disputes, War and Neutrality §§ 137-45 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
[hereinafter Oppenheim on War]; Tencer v. Mining & Industrial Corp., 4 I.L.R. 561, 561-62 (S.Ct.
Pol. 1927); Mazzoni v. Ministry of Finance, 4 I.L.R. 564, 564-65 (Italy 1927).
121. See Hague Regulations, supra note 120, arts. 4, 14, 53; Oppenheira on War, supra note
120, § 139.
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legitimate war contributions, 22 property of a de facto provisional
government,' 23 or property of an ethnic people seeking self-determination. 24
In addition, if collected for a public purpose, the bank accounting may be
viewed as state archives.'5
If this Court deems the funds private, Arden may have a duty to transfer
them to ICTFI, in light of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunal statutes,
which enable the return of property and proceeds to their rightful owners. 126 If
this Court deems the funds public, under the broad definition of state
property,' 27 Arden must protect them under principles of state succession.
Although few well established principles of international law apply to state
succession, 128  "state property located in third countries must be distributed
equitably among the successor states in accordance with an agreement to be
reached among them. "129 Similarly, the Austrian Supreme Court recently held
that surrendering property to only one successor state amounts to an
expropriation without compensation. 1
30
122. Hague Regulations, supra note 120, arts. 49-51; Oppenheim on War, supra note 120, §§
146-48; L Vetek v. N. Durnbacher & Co., 4 I.L.R. 566, 566-67 (Hung. S.Ct. 1927).
123. International Law Commission Draft Articles on Succession of States: Succession in
Respect of Matters Other than Treaties, March 24, 1970, art. 8, cmt. § Ill(E), (F), U.N.Doc.
A/CN.4/226, (Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter State Succession Articles];
Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 167; see Irish Free State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit Co., 222 N.Y.S. 182,
188 (1927).
124. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, Op. 2, 4 (1992); United Nations Conference on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, 22 I.L.M. 298, 305 (1983);
see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 343.
125. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, April 8, 1983, art. 20, 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983) [hereinafter Property Convention]; State
Succession Articles, supra note 123, art. 7, cmts. II, III(B).
126. Rwandan Tribunal Statute; supra note 14, art. 23(3); Yugoslavian Tribunal Statute, supra
note 14, art. 23(3); Charter, supra note 2, arts. 25, 29, 48, 49, 103.
127. See Property Convention, supra note 125, art. 8; State Succession Articles, supra note
123, art. 1, commentary; P. K. Menon, The Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, State
Property, Archives, and Debts 79-82 (1991); Lillich & Weston, supra note 95, at 122; see also supra
notes 36-40.
128. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation on the Arbitration
Commission under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Advisory Opinions Nos. 11-15 of the Arbitration
Commission, 32 I.L.M. 1586, Question 4, 1 (1993) [hereinafter FYAC]; Menon, supra note 127,
at 79; Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 68.
129. FYAC, supra note 128, at Question 6, 1; see Property Convention, supra note 125, art.
18; Republic of Croatia v. Girocredit Bank A. G. Der Sparkassen, 36 I.L.M. 1520, 1529 (Aust. Sup.
Ct. 1997); see also Oppenheim on War, supra note 120, § 316.
130. Girocredit, 36 I.L.M. at 1529; FYAC, supra note 128, at Question 6, 4.
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Both Remorra and Nylesia have interests in the funds and accounting,
whether deemed public or private. Absent clear evidence regarding the origin
of and title to the bank funds and accounting, 3' Arden must protect these funds.
Lacking any clear international duty to send the funds and accounting to
Remorra, Arden may properly uphold its domestic laws.
B. Arden Has No Duty to Provide the Funds or Accounting to Remorra.
Arden does not wish to keep the money for its own purposes, but it is not
bound by international law to deliver the accounting or funds to Remorra.
Arden is not a party to any international agreements regarding the disclosure
of private bank information in civil, criminal or tax contexts. Although several
states have signed treaties proscribing illicit drug transfer and related money
laundering,'32 customary international law does not require such disclosure. 133
Moreover, numerous states have enacted bank secrecy laws prohibiting the
disclosure of private bank information.' 34 Even existing mutual assistance
treaties give broad discretion in refusing or postponing disclosure. 135
Under international law, states have a sovereign right to decide what laws
to enact within their own territories. 136 As present state practice is inconsistent
and no applicable international law obligations exist, Remorra's accounting and
funds request must be denied.
Absent admission of responsibility, ratification, adoption, or lack of due
diligence, states are not responsible for the acts of private parties. 117 Arden has
131. See generally Kwstammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 20 I.L.M. 1122 (U.S. 1981), aff'd
by 21 I.L.M. 773 (U.S. 1982).
132. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991);
Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, December 14, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1419
(1991).
133. Richard Preiss, Privacy of Financial Information and Civil Rights Issues: the Implications
for Investigating and Prosecuting International Economic Crime, 14 Dick.J. Int'l L. 525, 537 (1996).
134. See Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks, arts. 47(1)-(2) (Switz. 1934), as
amended Federal Law of March 11, 1971; Penal Code, art. 273 (Switz.); Banks and Trust Companies
Regulations Act (Amendment), No. 3, § 2 (Bahamas 1980); Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law, No. 16 (Cayman Is. 1976) (amended No. 26, 1979); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Can.
Rev. Stat. Ch. 49, § 5(1) (1985); Law of July 16, 1980, L. No. 80-538, arts. 1-3, 75 Am. J. Int'l L.
382, 383 (1981), amending Law of July 26, 1968, L. No. 68-678, 1968 J.O. 7267, 1968 D.S.L. 248
(Fr.).
135. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 132, arts. 7(12), 7(15), 7(17); European Money
Laundering Treaty, supra note 132, arts. 9, 18(1)-(8).
136. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.), No. 9, 18-21; Barcelona Traction,
1970 I.C.J. at 249-50; Restatement, supra note 2, § 403; Brownlie, supra note 93, at 41, 287, 291;
Oscar Schachter, International Theory and Law in Practice 254 (1991).
137. See U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 56-7;
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 18, 21; Restatement, supra note 2, § 702, cmt. N, and reporter's note
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neither condoned, ratified nor been complicit as an "accessory after the fact" 13
in Terraq's actions. Instead, Arden has detained Terraq and intends to
transport him to ICTFI. 139  Arden pursued possible claims regarding the
suspicious funds and is now acting under court order in compliance with certain
provisions of its bank secrecy laws, enforced by the privately-owned bank."o
The actions of Terraq and the bank cannot be imputed to Arden.
C. Arden Can Decline Recognition and Enforcement of the Default
Judgment.
Individuals have a duty to exhaust local remedies before a state can
institute international proceedings on their behalf. 4 ' Arden originally
impounded the questioned accounts as suspicious. Remorra then failed to come
forward when Arden advertised the accounts 42 and brought no claim for the
accounts within Arden. Remorra cannot now claim the funds. Furthermore,
absent a treaty obligation, international law requires no state to recognize or
enforce foreign judgments. 143 Indeed, under principles of comity, states may
decline to enforce foreign judgments that violate international law, conflict with
their fundamental public policy principles, or represent the public law of a
foreign state, such as revenue, penal or confiscatory legislation.'"
Arden and Remorra are not parties to any international agreements
regarding the recognition of foreign judgments or legal instruments. Here, the
Remorran court entered a default judgment only 21 days after proceedings were
instituted, indicating a lack of fairness to Terraq and implicating public policy
concerns. Thus, Arden may decline recognition and enforcement of the default
judgment against Terraq.
V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
11; Brownlie on State Responsibility, supra note 90, at 161-62; see also Orentlicher, supra note 45,
at 2583.
138. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [195012 Y.B.Int'l
L. Comm'n 364, 374-77; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 398 (1992).
139. Comp. 29, 45.
140. Comp. 40; Clar. 1 4.
141. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27; C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in
International Law 45 (1990); Trindade, supra note 87, at 7-13; Oppenheim, supra note 22, § 153.
142. Comp. 39.
143. Michael Akehurst, Juisdiction in International Law, [1972-73] 46 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 145,
238; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 229 (1895); Godard v. Gray, 6 L.R.Q.B. 139, 148 [1870].
144. See Brussells Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 27, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1424 (1990); Inter-American
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, art.
2(h), 19 I.L.M. 1224 (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Marsoner v. United States, 40 F.3d 959
(9th Cir. (Ariz.) 1994) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Oppenheim, supra note 22, §§ 113, 143.
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For the reasons stated above, Arden respectfully asks this Honorable
Court to declare and adjudge that:
(1) Arden's decision to surrender Terraq to ICTFI and its
jurisdiction over Terraq are supported by the U.N. Charter and
customary international law;
(2) The 1965 Extradition Treaty between Arden and the former
Integra is no longer in effect, and that Arden's refusal to extradite
Terraq to Remorra is consistent with international law;
(3) Arden has no duty to make reparations to Remorra or fund
a Truth Commission; and
(4) Under international law, Arden need not transfer the funds
or accounting to Remorra or recognize the US$20 million default
judgment rendered in Remorra.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Arden
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